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RADIO PROPAGANDA REPORT

SOME ISSUES IN THE PURGE OF MARSHAL ZHUKOV

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PROPAGANDA REPORT
20 DECEMBER 1957

SOME ISSUES IN THE PURGE OF MARSHAL ZHUKOV

Contents

Summary	1
Introduction.	4
Historical Conflict Between Professional Soldiers and Party .	5
The Principle of "One-Man Command" in the Army	
Zhukov's Rise in Status After Stalin's Death.	6
Increased Emphasis on "One-Man Command"	
Zhukov's Views on Party-Army Relations.	8
Deference to Over-all Party Leadership	
Party Organs as Assistants to Army Commanders	
Protest Against Party Criticism of Commanders	
Party-Army Accommodation on Eve of June Purge	12
The Central Committee's "Instructions"	
Party Bid for Stronger Influence in the Armed Forces	
After the June Purge: "All Communists Are Equal"	15
No Special Status for Army Commanders in the Party	
Role of the Central Committee's "Instructions" in the Zhukov Purge.	18
"Instructions" Now Called Corrective to Zhukov's Policies	
Warnings to Commanders to Heed Party Criticism	
Since the Zhukov Purge: New Party Inroads into Army Affairs.	20
Appendix.	22

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PROPAGANDA REPORT
20 DECEMBER 1957

- 1 -

SOME ISSUES IN THE PURGE OF MARSHAL ZHUKOV

Summary

Background of Conflict: The core of the Central Committee's charges against Zhukov, that he resisted the intrusion of Party agencies and activities into the regular military chain of command, reflects a conflict of interests between the Party and the army which has been chronic in Soviet history. Until recently this conflict had been submerged and the armed forces had achieved a greater degree of relative autonomy in the post-Stalin period than at any time in the past; this resulted from the prolonged division in the Party leadership, contending factions of which were obliged at least to avoid provoking the marshals' enmity.

Marshal Zhukov, who in June 1957 became the first professional soldier to gain a seat in the Party Presidium, was the major beneficiary of the armed forces' rise in status and prestige after Stalin's death. His administration of the Defense Ministry was marked by renewed emphasis on the principle of edinonachalie, one-man or unified command, in the armed forces. Under this principle, officially in force since 1942, full control of all aspects of military life is vested in the commander, in contrast with the practice in some earlier periods when political officers (commissars or zampolits) either shared full command with professional soldiers or retained control over political training. During Zhukov's administration the influence of the Main Political Administration (MPA), which functions as a department of the Party Central Committee for the armed forces, waned, and the time devoted to political training of military personnel appears to have been reduced.

Zhukov's public statements never appeared to question the Party's leading role in formulating basic defense policy, and his critical remarks on Party-political work in the armed forces in all but one case stopped short of condemning any phase of it as objectionable interference in military life. In his single public objection Zhukov broached the sensitive question of Party criticism of commanders, a question which may have been at the heart of his insistence that edinonachalie must be further strengthened. For while that principle entitles the commander to unquestioning obedience from all subordinates in his chain of command, the same commander in his Party capacity is theoretically no more than the equal of his fellow Communists and subject to the same Party discipline and ritual of criticism and self-criticism. By condemning criticism of the "service-activity" of commanders at Party meetings, Zhukov, in January 1956, in effect demanded at least partial extension of edinonachalie from the military establishment proper to its Party organizations.

Central Committee "Instructions" Indicate Compromise: Late in April 1957 the Central Committee issued a new set of "Instructions to CPSU Organizations in the Soviet Army and Navy," evidently designed to delineate more precisely functions and responsibilities as between Party-political organs and commanders in the armed forces. Their

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DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 95358
BSSA NARA Date 8/20/09~~CONFIDENTIAL~~PROPAGANDA REPORT
20 DECEMBER 1957~~- 2 -~~

issuance suggests that either Khrushchev or Zhukov, or both, were acutely sensitive to the existence of grounds for a possible falling-out and sought a mutual accommodation of views in advance of the show-down with the opposition to Khrushchev in the Presidium.

In calling for a strengthening of Party influence "in all aspects of the life and activity of the troops," including military as well as political training, the Instructions acknowledged that the armed forces were not to be excepted from the general trend toward activating Party influence which has been particularly apparent since Khrushchev's ascendancy. But at the same time the Instructions also strongly reaffirmed edinonachalie and enjoined Party organizations to support the authority of the commander. The major concession to edinonachalie related directly to Zhukov's stricture against criticism of commanders at Party meetings: The Instructions provided that "criticism of the orders and regulations of commanders is not permitted at Party meetings."

While this provision, which has no known precedent in official documents on Party work in the armed forces, presumably went a long way toward satisfying Zhukov, the immunity it granted was clearly less categorical than that which he had demanded. The phrase, "orders and regulations" (prikazy i rasporyazhenii) could be interpreted broadly as encompassing all acts performed by the commander in the line of duty, i.e., his "service activity"; but it could also be taken literally as referring only to articulated orders and regulations. Provisions of the Instructions governing the proper usages of Party criticism which were made public did not clarify this point. While Zhukov had said that criticism of the commander's "service activity" reduces his authority, the Instructions insisted that Communists, who, "by their offenses, actions and conduct, injure their own authority among subordinates, must not be shielded from criticism."

Anti-Zhukov Interpretation of "Instructions": Shortly after the June purge, which perhaps freed Khrushchev's hands, the military press began to carry articles by MPA generals and Party workers which elaborated a narrow interpretation of the Instructions' provision banning criticism of commanders' orders and regulations; inveighed against commanders who tried to transform the limited immunity granted into total immunity from criticism; and emphasized that as Party members, commanders were subject to the same Party rules as other members of their units. Pointed attacks were leveled at commanders who regarded criticisms of shortcomings in training "in no other way than as undermining their authority, as interference in the service functions of the chief."

On the day Zhukov returned to Moscow from his Balkan trip, editorials in the military press implied that the Instructions had been drawn up specifically to correct a situation Zhukov was subsequently accused of having created; after release of the Central Committee decision on Zhukov, this implication was spelled out. The provision prohibiting criticism of the commanders' orders and regulations has been reaffirmed, but in a narrowly literal sense,

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PROPAGANDA REPORT
20 DECEMBER 1957

~~-3-~~

and SOVIET FLEET on 22 November for the first time explicitly rejected the notion that the commander's "service activity" was immune to Party criticism.

Although outright abolition of edinonachalie seems out of the question, some modification of that principle in the direction of weakening the commander's position vis-a-vis that of the Party agent is already in progress. The number of hours devoted to political indoctrination of officers and enlisted men has been increased and, in the case of officers, made mandatory. Reactivation of military councils, which will bring the influence of regional Party Secretaries more directly to bear at the military district level, has been called for, as well as more active participation by local Party committees in the life of military units stationed within their areas of jurisdiction.

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CONFIDENTIAL

PROPAGANDA REPORT
 20 DECEMBER 1957

- 4 -

SOME ISSUES IN THE PURGE OF MARSHAL ZHUKOV

Introduction

Although the Central Committee decision ousting Marshal Zhukov charged that he had "pursued a policy" of curtailing the work of Party and political organs in the armed forces and of abolishing Party and government leadership of the army and navy, it stopped short of accusing him of attempting to seize political power through his control of the armed forces. The marshal's lack of "modesty" and "understanding" rather than his personal political ambitions were stressed in the major purge documents--the Central Committee decision, PRAVDA's 3 November editorial article and Marshal Konev's indictment. By contrast, the Malenkov-Molotov-Kaganovich "anti-Party group" was directly charged in June 1957 with attempting to seize control of the Party leadership and to change the political line of the country. Beria had been accused in July 1953 of trying to seize leadership of the Party and country in order to destroy the Party and its policies.

While Konev--Zhukov's sharpest critic and the military leader most closely associated with Khrushchev--went so far as to allege a "definite tendency" on Zhukov's part to "regard the Soviet armed forces as his own domain," the deposed Defense Minister was at no point accused of trying to place the armed forces above the Party and government, the charge leveled against Beria in regard to the secret police.

It appears that Zhukov was adjudged guilty of seeking for the armed forces a greater degree of independence from the Party--or of resisting Party encroachments on the independence already gained by the military command--rather than of attempting to achieve army domination over Party and state. Zhukov's removal seems, therefore, to have been a precautionary move to check the development of a potential threat rather than a response to a direct challenge by Zhukov. The Central Committee journal KOMMUNIST (No. 16), explaining the necessity of the Zhukov purge as a preventive measure, declared that if Zhukov's line had not been "rooted out" in time by the Central Committee, "it would have led to serious, harmful consequences for the defense of our country, for the building of communism."

Whether or not Zhukov could ever have realized the potential attributed to him, his position, particularly since the June purge of the "anti-Party group," had been growing increasingly incompatible with the over-all Soviet leadership situation. He was the sole member of the ruling Presidium exercising direct authority over an instrument of physical power outside the Party. That instrument, the armed forces, was the only major Soviet institution to have gained rather than lost a measure of freedom of action vis-a-vis the Party since Stalin's death. Regardless of Marshal Zhukov's personal political ambitions or qualifications, the degree of his control over the armed forces and the relationship of the armed forces to the Party must have become questions of imperative concern to the Party leadership. These questions were posed in particularly acute form after the secret police, then the government apparatus, and finally the economic bureaucrats were compelled one after another to accept the tight stewardship of the Party, which was itself increasingly becoming identified with Khrushchev and his coterie of professional Party apparatchiks.

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CONFIDENTIAL

PROPAGANDA REPORT
20 DECEMBER 1957

- 5 -

In all of its major conflicts with the spokesmen of competing institutions, the Party machine under Khrushchev had enjoyed the support or at least the benevolent neutrality of Zhukov and the professional military elite, presumably because in each case either the interests of the Party and army coincided or the alternative to the Khrushchev machine was unacceptable to the military. But after the June purge there seemed no longer any major internal threat which could unite the USSR's two surviving centers of power. The issues between them, long present but submerged in the pursuit of common goals, rose quickly to the surface in the second half of 1957.

There are no indications in the propaganda that Zhukov deliberately precipitated a show-down with Khrushchev and the Party. The show-down seems rather to have occurred as the culmination of a process of political erosion which saw layer after layer of buffer separating the two wear down, leaving Zhukov, regardless of his intentions, in a dangerously exposed position from which he was suddenly toppled.

HISTORICAL CONFLICT BETWEEN PROFESSIONAL SOLDIERS AND THE PARTY

Aside from the personal charges of conceit and rudeness leveled against Zhukov, evidently calculated to offset his popularity, the Central Committee's basic case against the marshal is that he opposed the intrusion of Party agencies and activities into the regular military chain of command. Conflict between the interests of the Party, focused on maximizing the political reliability of the armed forces, and the interests of professional commanders, centered on maximizing their military efficiency, has been chronic in Soviet history. Efforts to resolve the conflict have favored at times the Party's interests and at other times those of the professional soldiers, the crucial factor in most cases being the magnitude of the military threat facing the USSR.

The Principle of "One-Man Command" in the Army

When the Red Army was first organized, it had to rely on commanding personnel recruited primarily from the former Tsarist Army. To insure their loyalty, the regime established a hierarchy of military commissars who shared military command with the professionals. All military orders had to be countersigned by the commissars, who were also empowered to arrest military commanders for counterrevolutionary activity. Under peacetime conditions in 1925, the principle of edinonachalie--one-man or unified command--was applied to the spheres of combat, supply and administration, which were placed under sole control of commanders, while the commissars retained control only over political training. Three years later it was decreed that military commanders who were Party members for a specified period of time could assume the role of full-powered edinonachalniks.

In 1937, in connection with the purge of Marshal Tukhachevsky and the Red Army high command, edinonachalie was abolished and the commissars were made coequal with the commanders in military as well as political affairs. The military inefficiency of this arrangement became so evident during the early stages of the Soviet-Finnish war that another reversal was effected, and in August 1940 the Red Army reverted to edinonachalie. Political commissars were abolished and replaced by assistant commanders for political affairs (zampolits), whose sphere of action was limited largely to political propaganda and education.

In July 1941, shortly after the German invasion of the USSR, the institution of political commissars was reinstituted in the face of stunning military

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PROPAGANDA REPORT
20 DECEMBER 1957

20 DECEMBER 1957

Although edinonachalie has been in force in principle uninterruptedly since 1942, its course in practice has been marked by fluctuations over the past 15 years. The Soviet Army emerged from World War II with its prestige at an all-time high and its leaders, notably Marshal Zhukov, celebrated as national heroes. But in the early postwar years of transition to "cold war"--a struggle waged both on the domestic and foreign-relations fronts--stricter political controls were once again imposed on the armed forces. A swing in the opposite direction appears to have occurred some time before Stalin's death, possibly in response to the Korean war and new demands placed upon the armed forces by Soviet development of nuclear weapons. At the XIX Party Congress in October 1952, Marshal Vasilevsky, then First Deputy Defense Minister, spoke of measures carried out by the Party Central Committee and the government for "further, still greater strengthening" of edinonachalie and asserted the Party leadership's confidence in the political reliability of military commanders:

The shift to complete edinsonachalie was possible even during the Great Patriotic War because excellently trained commanders emerged in the Army, commanders who were completely devoted to the cause of socialism, who were politically seasoned and who had mastered Stalinist military science.

An article on edinonachalie in Volume 15 of the LARGE SOVIET ENCYCLOPEDIA, published at the time of the XIX Congress, asserted that Lenin and Stalin "had always considered edinonachalie the only correct method of managing work in the army," but that prior conditions had first to be created for its implementation.

The Soviet armed forces enjoyed an almost immediate rise in status and prestige at the time of Stalin's death as a result of the deemphasis of Stalin as supreme war lord and the shift in the army-secret police balance of power. The bargaining position of the leaders of the armed forces was strengthened by the existence of a chronically divided political leadership, contending factions of which were obliged, if not to cater to the professional soldiers, at least to avoid provoking their enmity.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PROPAGANDA REPORT
20 DECEMBER 1957

- 7 -

Marshal Zhukov was one of the major beneficiaries of the reorganization of the Soviet leadership after Stalin's death and the ensuing factional struggle. Emerging from relative obscurity in March 1953, he became First Deputy Defense Minister under Bulganin. In July 1953 he was raised to full membership in the CPSU Central Committee, presumably filling the vacancy created by Beria's removal.

In the governmental reorganization which followed Malenkov's demotion in February 1955, Zhukov became Minister of Defense, the first non-political marshal in Soviet history designated to head the combined armed forces of the USSR. His appointment was followed in March 1955 by the promotion of 10 general officers to the rank of marshal.

After the XX Congress in 1956, Zhukov was elected candidate member of the Central Committee Presidium. In a departure from the then current "collective leadership" practice, his name was placed out of alphabetical order at the head of the list of candidates, putting him first in line for succession to full membership. In June 1957, Zhukov became the first professional soldier ever elected to a seat in the Party's supreme organ of power.

Increased Emphasis on "One-Man Command"

Zhukov's assumption of the post of Defense Minister in February 1955 coincided with a renewed emphasis in the military press on the need to strengthen military discipline and edinonachalie in the armed forces. The themes were not new, but the forcefulness of their reassertion was striking. On 31 March RED STAR catalogued the major slogans:

The armed forces are favored with splendid cadres of officers, completely devoted to the Party and people and knowing their job perfectly.

An order of the commander is an order of the motherland.

A soldier or non-commissioned officer receiving an order has no right to doubt its expediency, to discuss it, to call in question the action of the superior or to object to it.

Soviet officers are of one flesh and blood with the people. They are placed in their responsible posts by order of the Party and they enjoy its full confidence.

Lenin declared: "Rule without the slightest wavering, rule more strictly than the capitalist ruled you.... Otherwise you will not defeat him."

Within a month after Zhukov's appointment, RED STAR editorially deplored meddling by Party secretaries in the affairs of the military commanders of their units (4 March 1955). It was revealed after Zhukov's ouster that during his tenure as Defense Minister the number of hours devoted to political indoctrination of enlisted men was reduced and that the indoctrination of officers was placed on a voluntary, rather than mandatory, basis.* Under Zhukov's administration of the armed forces, the influence of the Main Political Administration (MPA), which functions as the Central Committee's department for

* See p. 20.

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DECLASSIFIED
 Authority NND45358
 BY SP8/20/07

CONFIDENTIAL

 PROPAGANDA REPORT
 20 DECEMBER 1957

- 8 -

the armed forces as well as an agency of the Defense Ministry, went into decline. It has been assumed that sometime after April 1955 the post of deputy commander for political affairs (zampolit) was abolished at the company level, leaving political as well as military training exclusively in the hands of company commanders.*

After the XX Party Congress in February 1956, although Zhukov was promoted to candidate membership in the Presidium and professional military representation on the Central Committee was raised from four to six,** no representatives of the Main Political Administration were elected either as full or candidate members of the Central Committee. Colonel General Zheltov's deputy and predecessor as chief of the MPA, Colonel General Kuznetsov, who was elected to candidate membership in the Central Committee after the XIX Party Congress, was dropped to the lower post of member of the Party's Central Auditing Commission while Zheltov himself did not gain a seat on any of the Party's central bodies.

Zhukov's political counterparts in the armed forces were thus denied direct representation at the Party summit. Marshal Moskalenko has charged (in RED STAR, 3 November 1957) that as a result of Zhukov's "rude trampling of Leninist principles" of directing the armed forces, "the situation had reached the point where Communists were actually not permitted to address the Central Committee of the Party, to express their proposals and ideas."

ZHUKOV'S VIEWS ON PARTY-ARMY RELATIONS

Zhukov's own position on the question of Party-army relations cannot be precisely reconstructed on the basis of his public statements, which only infrequently touched on sensitive issues, but certain broad outlines of his approach may be discerned.

Deference to Over-all Party Leadership

The marshal by no means played down the role of the Party in formulating basic defense policy and in "building" the Soviet armed forces. His articles and speeches, before military audiences as well as on ceremonial occasions are

* Zhukov appeared to confirm this assumption, based largely on the cessation of references to zampolits at the company level in the military press, in a speech in January 1956: "As is well known," he said, "the role of the company and battery commanders in the education of personnel has been raised sharply." (RED STAR, 25 January 1956) The abolition of company and battery level zampolits in the Czechoslovak Army has been explicitly confirmed in a recent article in the Czechoslovak Army paper OBRANA LIDU (9 November 1957).

** Only three non-political marshals were elected to full membership in the Central Committee at the XIX Congress, but Zhukov was raised from candidate membership in July 1953. The number of active military officers among candidate members of the Central Committee dropped from 22 after the XIX Congress to 12 after the XX Congress. However, two of the candidates elected in 1952 were MPA officers, and two of the marshals dropped from candidate status at the XX Congress were elected to the Party's Central Inspection Commission.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PROPAGANDA REPORT
20 DECEMBER 1957

- 9 -

interspersed with references to the Party's "decisive" role in creating, developing and strengthening the Soviet military establishment and in assuring its victory in armed conflicts. Descriptions of the Soviet armed forces as "created and reared by the Communist Party," or "inspired and led by the Communist Party" appeared frequently in his public statements.

On many occasions Zhukov expressed the armed forces' gratitude for the Party's "solicitude" and for its efforts to strengthen the country's military might and defense potential. He attributed fundamental decisions affecting the structure of the armed forces to the Central Committee and the government, as in his statement at the XX Congress that the Central Committee and the government "are devoting special attention to the development of the air force as the most important means of insuring our motherland's security."

Zhukov's public statements contain nothing to support the charge that he challenged the principle of Party control over the armed forces, at least on the Central Committee and Presidium level. The marshal may have been confident that professional military representation in the Central Committee and his own membership in the Presidium provided adequate safeguards against the adoption of decisions harmful to the armed forces' interests--particularly since, until recently, the Party leadership was itself badly divided.

Party Organs as Assistants to Army Commanders

Zhukov's public statements on the work of Party and political organs within the armed forces are largely limited to three speeches--one delivered on the eve of the XX CPSU Congress at a Party conference of the Moscow Military District, another at a conference of leading political workers in the army and navy shortly after the XX Congress, and a third at an all-army conference of outstanding servicemen in March 1957.

In these speeches Zhukov's remarks on political training were critical but stopped short--in all but one case--of protesting any phase of Party-political work as objectionable interference in military activity. On the other hand, he did not seem to allow for a wide latitude of Party initiative in the armed forces, emphasizing instead those duties of political organs and Party organizations that were designed to help the commander and to implement his orders.

In his January 1956 speech he particularly stressed the need for Party and MPA agencies to assist the commanders in strengthening military discipline. He implied that Party organizations were not fully cooperating with his insistence on firm discipline. He charged that in the Moscow Military District, exacting officers who implant order with a firm hand "are not always given backing." And he deplored instances when, "instead of imposing punishment on one who has violated military discipline, the chief has limited himself to warnings and persuasions."*

In April 1956 Zhukov demanded "major improvement" in political training of personnel and the use of "new, more effective methods of Party-political

* Zhukov's preoccupation with questions of military discipline in his public speeches has been used to advantage by the Party leadership and the marshal's rivals in the armed forces, who have attempted to diminish his popularity by depicting him as an overbearing martinet, relying on rude administrative methods rather than the inculcation of a high degree of consciousness in order to maintain and strengthen military discipline.

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DECLASSIFIED
 Authority NND45358
 BY NARA Date 8/20/09

CONFIDENTIAL

PROPAGANDA REPORT
 20 DECEMBER 1957

- 10 -

work." He called for a "reorganization" of methods and forms of political work aimed at imparting to it a more practical character:

All this requires that our political organs, and above all the Main Political Administration and political directors of the various armed forces, reorganize the content and especially the methods of propaganda. On the subject of propaganda work, problems of a military-ideological character connected with the practical tasks confronting the troops must occupy a greater place. It is necessary resolutely to liquidate aimlessness and abstract instruction, of which we still have a great deal, in educational work.

Citing the decisions of the XX Congress, he said that the mission of propaganda is not only to explain the theory of Marxism-Leninism, but to assist actively in putting it into practice. In the armed forces he discerned a special mission for ideological work:

In the armed forces, ideological work must also be directed toward insuring great conscientiousness of personnel and strict discipline, toward instilling in personnel a high morale-combat quality, and toward the further development of Soviet military science.

He charged that Party-political work was often conducted formally, "in isolation from actual situations and tasks of the army and navy." He insisted that political workers must understand military affairs "as well as the laws of social development" in order to be able to cope with the missions entrusted to them. He again emphasized that political organs and Party organizations must strengthen military discipline, the first step toward which, he said, was strengthening edinonachalie and increasing the authority of commanders. According to RED STAR,

Comrade Zhukov said that political organs and Party organizations are not always actually and skillfully occupied with matters of discipline. This is a mistake. It is the responsibility of political organs and Party organizations to educate servicemen in the spirit of punctual and precise execution of all the orders, regulations and instructions, without exception. The strengthening of discipline must begin first of all with the strengthening of edinonachalie and increasing of the authority of command cadres, and with personal exemplariness of Communists and Komsomol members and their irreconcilability toward infringers of discipline.

Single Protest Against Party Censure of Commanders

In the one instance when he publicly objected to Party activity in the armed forces, Zhukov broached the question of criticism of military commanders at meetings of army and navy Party organizations. This question may have been at the heart of the marshal's insistence that edinonachalie must be strengthened in every way.

While the principle of edinonachalie provides that the commander is entitled to unquestioning obedience from all subordinates in his chain of command, including his assistant commander for political affairs, the same commander in his Party capacity is theoretically no more than the equal of his fellow Party members and is subject to the same Party discipline and ritual of criticism and self-criticism.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PROPAGANDA REPORT
20 DECEMBER 1957

- 11 -

The partly contradictory requirements of Party membership and military command have recently been discussed in the Polish military press in connection with the "verification campaign" in progress in military as well as civilian units of the Party. Brig. Gen. Czeslaw Waryszak, Commander of the Silesian Military Region, wrote in the Polish Army paper ZOLNIERZ WOLNOSCI on 2 December:

We are aware the position of the commanding officer in a Party branch of the army is a peculiar one. The Party branch does not take over the prerogatives of the commander; it does not share command with him.... Although the Party organization does not interfere in the official affairs of the commander, it is by no means indifferent to whether a commanding officer who is a Party member discharges his duties properly, whether his attitude is that of a Communist, whether he skillfully utilizes the observations and proposals of the Party branch.

In his January 1956 speech to the Moscow Military District Party Conference, Zhukov addressed himself to the sensitive problem of Party criticism of military commanders. He demanded in effect that at least insofar as immunity to criticism is concerned, the principle of edinonachalie be extended from the military establishment proper to its Party organizations:

Individual attempts have been noted in the district to subject the service activity (sluzhebnyaya devatel'nost') of commanders to criticism at Party meetings. Any such attempts should be censured. Our task is to strengthen in every way the authority of commanders and to support exacting officers and generals.

The section of the CPSU statutes dealing with Party organizations in the armed forces makes no special provision protecting commanders against any form of Party criticism, nor had any Party spokesman anticipated Zhukov's stricture so far as is known. Zhukov's statement was carried in military press accounts of his speech, but not in the civilian press nor by Radio Moscow, which merely reported that the marshal had addressed the conference.

Zhukov did not reiterate his demand when he addressed a conference of leading MPA workers in April, several months after the XX Congress. Nor did the MPA chief, Colonel General Zheltov, who delivered the conference's main report, address himself directly to the subject, according to RED STAR's account of his speech. But Zheltov is reported to have "called special attention to strict maintenance in army and navy Party organizations of the norms of Party life developed by the great Lenin"--thus extending to Party organizations in the armed forces this anti-Stalin cult slogan of the XX Congress. Among these "Leninist norms," which were said to have been violated under Stalin's rule, the propaganda of that period frequently mentioned the requirement for "principled and open criticism and self-criticism." It is possible that Zheltov raised this slogan in veiled opposition to Zhukov, whose call for a ban on criticism of the service activity of commanders was clearly not in keeping with the new emphasis on observing "Leninist norms" of Party life.

Zhukov failed, in calling for improvement of Party-political work, to enjoin army and navy Party organizations to observe these "Leninist norms." Instead, he delivered a pointed warning against attempts to use the condemnation of the cult of personality as a means of undermining the authority of commanders in the armed forces. The RED STAR account of his April 1956 speech notes only that he "dwelt briefly on the matter of overcoming the

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Authority NND45358

BSA NARA Date 8/20/09

REPRODUCED AT THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES

CONFIDENTIAL

PROPAGANDA REPORT
 20 DECEMBER 1957

- 12 -

consequences of the personality cult," but in an article published late in 1956 in the DOSAAF journal MILITARY KNOWLEDGE (No. 11) he is quoted as having warned:

We consider that he who attempts to interpret the struggle against the personality cult as a struggle against edinonachalie is doing a disservice to the effort to improve the combat proficiency of the armed forces.

PARTY-ARMY ACCOMMODATION ON EVE OF JUNE PURGE

The rapidity of Zhukov's fall so soon after his elevation to full membership in the Central Committee Presidium, and the apparent ease with which his removal was accomplished,* seems ironically to bear out PRAVDA's contention, in the 3 November editorial article, that Zhukov lacked "political maturity." Zhukov, having perhaps miscalculated Khrushchev's intentions or overestimated the solidity of his own position, may have been satisfied that a workable partnership arrangement had been established between himself and the Party First Secretary.

For four years while Khrushchev was battling his way to the top, Zhukov remained publicly aloof, withholding direct statements of support while some of his military colleagues, notably Konev, ostentatiously attached themselves to the Party leader. It was not until July 1957, after Khrushchev had already defeated his major opponents within the Party and measurably strengthened his bargaining position, that Zhukov publicly deferred to him--in his Leningrad speech on 15 July. Khrushchev, in turn, continued to capitalize on Zhukov's popularity by frequently referring to the Soviet Defense Minister in his public statements.

But there is evidence of a mutual Party-army accommodation reached shortly before the June crisis which suggests that either Zhukov or Khrushchev, or both, were acutely sensitive to the existence of grounds for a possible falling-out and sought to iron them out before risking a show-down with the opposition to Khrushchev in the Central Committee Presidium.

The Central Committee's "Instructions"

On 12 May, little more than a month before the intra-Party struggle reached its climax in the CPSU Presidium, editorials published simultaneously in the three armed forces newspapers, RED STAR, SOVIET FLEET and SOVIET AVIATION, announced that the Party Central Committee had promulgated a new set of "Instructions to the Organizations of the CPSU in the Soviet Army and Navy." It was later disclosed that the Instructions had been approved by the Central Committee on 27 April. Since no Central Committee plenum was held at that time, and since the document is not called a "decision," it is probable that it was drawn up in Khrushchev's Secretariat, presumably with the participation of the Defense Ministry and the Main Political Administration of the

* Speculation that Zhukov was able to mount effective resistance and that his fate hung in the balance for several days after his return to Moscow is not supported by an examination of Soviet propaganda during this period. Evidence that the decision to remove him from high Party office as well as from his Defense Ministry post was effectively taken prior to his return from Albania is documented in the Appendix to this report.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PROPAGANDA REPORT
20 DECEMBER 1957

- 13 -

armed forces. The text of these Instructions has not been published by overt media nor, so far as is known, have they ever been discussed in the Soviet civilian press. But portions of the document have been published--in quotes and in evident paraphrase--since May in the military press, which has discussed the Instructions at considerable length.

That the Instructions were designed to delineate functions and responsibilities as between the Party and the professional military commanders in the armed forces was indicated by the statement, frequently reiterated in one form or another in reviews of the document, that "in the new Instructions, basing itself on the experience of many years and proceeding from contemporary requirements, the Central Committee of the CPSU defines the content of the work, the role and the place of Party organizations in the solution of tasks for the further strengthening of the military might of the Armed Forces" (MILITARY HERALD No. 6, 1957).

In the past the vague area of overlap of military and political functions in the armed forces was the main battleground on which the battle for edinonachalie was fought, with the professional soldiers usually faced with encroachments by the Party in this area. Whether Khrushchev--in order to neutralize or gain the support of the marshals in the factional struggle--took the initiative, or whether Zhukov and his associates seized the opportunity to insist upon a more precise and binding delineation, the general tone of discussions of the Instructions suggests a compromise and accommodation of views rather than a clear-cut victory for either side,

Party Bid for Stronger Influence in Armed Forces

The Central Committee's Instructions appear to have established that the armed forces were not to be unaffected by the pronounced tendency toward activating Party influence in all aspects of Soviet life that has been apparent in the post-Stalin period, particularly since Khrushchev's ascendancy. Commentaries on the Instructions all attributed to that document the statement that the Central Committee demands a strengthening of Party influence on all aspects of the life and training of the troops. For example, MILITARY HERALD's editorial on the Instructions (No. 6, 1957) stated:

In connection with the directives of the XX CPSU Congress on the necessity for a general improvement in Party-organizational and ideological work, the Central Committee of the Party demands the further growth of the activeness and militancy of Party organizations, the strengthening of their influence on all aspects of life and activity of the troops.

While the tasks of the armed forces enumerated in the Instructions were, according to the commentaries, essentially the ones routinely stressed in the military press, strong emphasis was laid on the increased responsibility of Party organizations for getting those tasks fulfilled. It was made clear that this responsibility was to apply to tasks of military as well as political training:

The Instructions significantly raise the responsibility of Party organizations and of each Communist for further improving military and political training, for strengthening military discipline, the mastery of new techniques and weapons by personnel, the maintenance of constant combat preparedness by units and sub-units.

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NND45358

By SA NARA Date 8/20/09

CONFIDENTIAL

PROPAGANDA REPORT
20 DECEMBER 1957

- 14 -

Commentaries on the Instructions did not make a point of reiterating the principle of Party control over the armed forces--a principle reiterated so insistently just prior to publication of the Central Committee decision ousting Zhukov as to convey the impression that it had been challenged. But they did attribute to the Instructions the statement that the activity of Party organizations must be directed, among other things, "at rallying personnel around the Communist Party and the Soviet government...."

Absent from commentaries on the Instructions was any detailed critique of shortcomings in Party-political work in the armed forces such as is normally included in preambles to official Party decisions. It is conceivable that the text of the Instructions, not published, did discuss some of the shortcomings which the Instructions were designed to overcome.

But while calling for an upsurge in Party-political work and the extension of Party influence to all aspects of military life, the Instructions also reaffirmed the principle of edinonachalie and obligated Party organizations to strengthen it and to support the authority of the commander. Articles in the military press have revealed two concrete measures taken in the Instructions to strengthen the position of the commanders vis-a-vis Party organizations:

1. The first, discussed in an article in the HERALD OF THE AIR FORCE (No. 7, 1957), appears to grant to the military chain of command at least partial veto power in regard to decisions taken by Party organizations to discipline officers and non-commissioned officers who are Party members. The Instructions provide that penalties meted out to these Party members by their Party organizations must be approved by the zampolit and commander of the offender's unit. The article says nothing about the procedure to be followed if the reviewing officers should not approve the position of the Party organization, or if the zampolit and the commander should fail to agree. Penalties for violations of Party discipline committed by privates who are Party members, probably a rare combination, are presumably meted out by Party organizations without higher sanction.
2. The Central Committee's second--and major--concession to edinonachalie was directly related to Marshal Zhukov's January 1956 stricture against criticism of commanders' service activity at Party meetings. According to the 12 May RED STAR, the Instructions provide that

at Party meetings, criticism of the orders and regulations (prikazy i rasporyazhenii) of commanders is not permitted.

This provision, granting Communists who are military commanders at least a partial immunity to criticism, makes an exception for the commanders that is theoretically denied even to Presidium members.* It has no known precedent in official documents dealing with Party work in the armed forces. While the military press frequently, both before and after Zhukov's January 1956 speech, emphasized the sanctity of commanders' orders, so far as is known no ban on criticism of these orders at Party meetings was ever made explicit.

The Central Committee's official commitment to surrender--in the interests of edinonachalie--a portion of the Party's "sovereign" rights must have gone a

* The CPSU Statutes, as amended by the XIX Party Congress on Khrushchev's report, grant to Party members the right "to criticize any Party worker at Party meetings." The Statutes also obligate members "to report to leading Party bodies, right up to the Central Committee, shortcomings in work, irrespective of the persons involved."

CONFIDENTIAL

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CONFIDENTIAL

PROPAGANDA REPORT
20 DECEMBER 1957

- 15 -

long way toward satisfying Marshal Zhukov's wishes. But the immunity granted in the Instructions, applying to the commander's "orders and regulations," is clearly less categorical than what Zhukov demanded in January 1956, when he objected to censure of the "service activity" of the commander. The phrase "orders and regulations" could be interpreted broadly, as encompassing all acts performed by the commander in line of duty (Zhukov's "service activity"); but it could also be taken literally, as referring only to articulated orders and regulations.

This point is not clarified in the provisions of the Instructions--at least those publicized--that relate to proper targets of criticism at Party meetings. While Zhukov had said that criticism of the "service activity" of commanders reduces their authority, the Instructions insist that Communists who, "by their offenses, actions and conduct, injure their own authority among subordinates must not be shielded from criticism." And the Instructions do not explain precisely where the first line is to be drawn between censure of the commander's "orders and regulations" and criticism of inadequacies and shortcomings in military training, the former proscribed and the latter officially encouraged.

AFTER THE JUNE PURGE: "ALL COMMUNISTS ARE EQUAL"

Reviews of the Instructions in the military press in the spring did not choose between broad and narrow interpretations of the provision against criticism of the commanders' "orders and regulations." They praised that provision as strengthening edinonachalie, while at the same time praising the provision on criticism and self-criticism as creating conditions for activating Party work and strengthening Party influence in the armed forces.

But shortly after the June purge had removed Khrushchev's major Party rivals from positions of influence, thus perhaps freeing the First Secretary's hands to deal with the remaining potential threat to his power, new interpretations of the Instructions' provisions on criticism and self-criticism began to appear in the military press over the signatures of Main Political Administration generals and Party workers. These articles elaborated a narrow interpretation of the provision forbidding criticism of commanders' orders and regulations; inveighed against commanders who tried to transform the limited immunity granted by the Central Committee into a total immunity against criticism; and emphasized that, as Party members, commanders were subject to the same Party discipline as other members of their units.

No Special Status for Army Commanders in the Party

In a July article in HERALD OF THE AIR FORCE (No. 7), Lt. Gen. of Aviation A. G. Rytov, Chief of the Main Political Administration of the Air Force, stressed the Instructions' requirement that commanders participate more actively in the work of Party organizations. "The commander," he wrote, "must understand that he and his subordinates stand in one Party, a voluntary militant union of like-minded Communists, and as members of this Party enjoy equal rights and bear responsibility to it for the matter of defense, for the condition of their unit."

In a RED STAR article on 31 July, Maj. Gen. M. Kh. Kalashnik, who has been identified as head of the Party Organizations Section of the MPA, drove home this point by attacking commanders who attempted to use the Instructions as a device for stifling all criticism of military shortcomings. After reiterating the provisions of the Instructions on criticism and self-criticism, Kalashnik charged:

CONFIDENTIAL

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Authority NND45358
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DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 95358
B 8/20/09 NARA Date

CONFIDENTIAL

PROPAGANDA REPORT
20 DECEMBER 1957

- 16 -

However, even now there are among us individual Communists who regard criticism of shortcomings in study and education in no other way than as undermining their authority, as interference in the service functions of the chief.

As an example he cited the suppression of criticism of shortcomings in combat training made by a Communist officer at a Party meeting in the Northern Military District. The officer was censured at the meeting for "interfering in what was none of his business." Implying that this suppression intimidated other Party members, Kalashnik wrote that "after this the meeting became less active, the Communists having already decided not to make critical remarks in their speeches."

The MPA general also attacked an interpretation of the Instructions' ban on criticism of commanders' orders and regulations which may have won adherents among military commanders. According to this interpretation, categories of officers--presumably commanders--rather than categories of specific acts by these officers were to be placed beyond Party criticism. Kalashnik condemned such a view as a violation of fundamental Party principles:

The Instructions provide precise and clear rules about the direction which criticism and self-criticism must take at meetings of army and navy Party organizations. Nevertheless, in some places there are attempts to interpret these precise and clear rules of the Instructions in a way which is not altogether correct. In individual organizations there are attempts to establish which Communists may be criticized and which may not be. Such a posing of the question is fundamentally incorrect. In the Party there is no division between the "chosen" and the "unchosen"; there are not two disciplines, one for the leaders and another for the rank-and-file. In the Party there is one discipline; to the Party all members are equal, each having the same rights and the same obligations to the Party.

The crucial distinction between the officer's military role as a commander and his Party role as a Communist was emphasized in subsequent articles. A 10 August article by the commanding officer of an infantry regiment, Colonel Stupin, stressed that active participation in Party work was an important obligation of commanders. "It would be unpardonable," he wrote, if a commander ignored the advice of the secretary of the Party bureau of his unit, since the Party organization contains "the best people in the regiment." He recommended attendance at Party meetings by commanders and said that their participation ought not to be limited to the "giving of reports and some orders." Like Kalashnik, he stressed that all Communists are equal:

In our Party, as is known, there is no division between the "chosen" and the "unchosen." All Communists have equal rights. As a Party member, I am equal to all. I speak at meetings, I argue, I criticize.... There are occasions when someone comes along and corrects a person with whom he does not agree. Now there is nothing surprising in this, and it is quite proper.

While noting that Party meetings provide commanders with the opportunity to correct erroneous views of their military subordinates, Colonel Stupin also implied that commanders must themselves expect to be criticized and to indulge in self-criticism:

The opportunity came for me to speak at meetings, to explain mistakes and to offer my opinion on how to correct them. People must

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED
 Authority NND 45358
 BSA NARA Date 8/20/09

CONFIDENTIAL

 PROPAGANDA REPORT
 20 DECEMBER 1957

- 18 -

ROLE OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE'S "INSTRUCTIONS" IN THE ZHUKOV PURGE

In the spring of 1957, Marshal Zhukov may have regarded the Central Committee's Instructions as being responsive to his demand that edinonachalie be strengthened and that commanders be protected against Party criticism undermining their authority; but after the June purge of the "anti-Party group," his opponents in the Party and the MPA began to foster an interpretation of the Central Committee's directives far less favorable to Zhukov. On the day Zhukov returned to Moscow from his trip to Yugoslavia and Albania, editorials in the military press implied that the Instructions had been designed specifically to correct a situation which Zhukov was subsequently alleged to have created.

RED STAR on 26 October stated that the work of Party organizations in the armed forces had improved and that the role of the Party in military life had "considerably increased" in the half year since the Instructions were issued, but it implied that Zhukov had hampered their implementation. "There are still units and ships," RED STAR observed, "where the requirements of the CPSU Central Committee's Instructions have been only poorly implemented." After singling out instances of ineffectual use of criticism at Party meetings, it declared that "the task now is to implement more strictly the requirements of the CPSU Central Committee's Instructions."

SOVIET FLEET observed on the same day that "even now, several months after the issuance of the CPSU Central Committee's Instructions, there are still individuals who have not understood the role and importance of Party-political work."

"Instructions" Now Called Corrective to Zhukov's Policies

After the publication of the Central Committee resolution against Zhukov, the Instructions were directly interpreted as having been issued to counter Marshal Zhukov's policies. At the meeting of the Party aktiv of the Moscow Military District convened to approve the Central Committee resolution, one speaker, Ye. Ye. Gaponov, attacked Zhukov for depreciating Party-political work and stated that

up until the issuance of the CPSU Central Committee's Instructions, Party organizations were in fact deprived of rights provided for in the Party Statutes and were pushed aside from active participation in solution of the problems of military training. (RED STAR, 3 November 1957)

At a meeting of the Party aktiv of the Soviet armed forces in Germany, as described in a 5 November Radio Volga broadcast, several speakers used the phrase "until recently" in referring to the period during which Party-political work was curtailed:

Comrades Denshchikov, Chetverikov, Bednyagin, Talupka and others noted that the tendency to suppress criticism and self-criticism in the army Party organizations, which has been evident up until recently, was detrimental to the strengthening of military readiness. It also led to a decrease in the creative initiative of Party members, contributed to the development of overconfidence and smugness, and served as a cover for some ruffians.

One speaker explicitly attributed the curtailment of Party activity in the armed forces to Zhukov and indicated that the purpose of the Instructions had been to restore Party organizations to their proper role:

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PROPAGANDA REPORT
20 DECEMBER 1957

- 19 -

Comrade Mozhaev stated in his speech that up until recently, on the order of Comrade Zhukov, former Minister of Defense, the role of the Party and political activity in the armed forces had been reduced. This state of affairs resulted in the inability of many Party organizations to exercise the full power of their influence on over-all aspects of the life and training of army personnel. Up until the publication of the Instructions to CPSU Organizations in the Soviet Army and Navy, approved by the Party Central Committee, the Party organizations did not in fact carry out their tasks as stipulated in the CPSU Statutes.

Warnings to Commanders to Heed Party Criticism

The tone of warnings to commanders in the military press grew sharper. Although the ban on criticism of commanders' "orders and regulations" was reaffirmed, it was made clear that the phrase was to be interpreted narrowly and was not to be equated with the broader "service activity" for which Zhukov had demanded immunity from criticism in January 1956. At the meeting of the Party aktiv of the Moscow Military District, convened to approve the decisions of the October plenum,

all those who spoke unanimously stressed that the army Communists and Komsomol members well understand that criticism of the orders and instructions of the commander is not permitted. But they consider any criticism that touches on all other aspects of training, service, and Party work to be the moving force in the struggle for new successes. Only one who cares above all else for his own career, for his own well-being, can fear criticism. (RED STAR, 3 November)

In mid-November, authoritative commentaries defining the proper usages of criticism and self-criticism were published in the military press. SOVIET FLEET's 22 November editorial placed squarely on Zhukov the responsibility for "the decline of criticism and self-criticism as a means of struggling against shortcomings in the training and education of personnel." Zhukov was said to have "violated Lenin's principles on the leadership of the armed forces." The navy organ stressed that criticism and self-criticism must be applied "without regard to the person against whom they are directed."

Invoking the CPSU Statutes, SOVIET FLEET asserted that "no Communist has the right to pass over shortcomings, much less to hide them, and to be indifferent toward various negative phenomena." The editorial implied that Party criticism was now regarded as a weapon designed to prevent the rise of another Zhukov in the armed forces:

Among some Communists there is the incorrect view that, allegedly, criticism undermines the authority of leaders, and in particular of commanders. This is a profound fallacy. There is not and there cannot be correct education of cadres in places where there is an atmosphere of passing over shortcomings in silence. It is no secret that in such an atmosphere some comrades lose their qualities as political leaders, separate themselves from the masses, become victims of haughtiness and disdainful pride, and let themselves be carried away by empty methods of administration.

Referring to the existence of "ignominious cases of persecuting people because of their criticism," SOVIET FLEET for the first time explicitly rejected the notion that criticism of a commander's "service activity" at

CONFIDENTIAL

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By SA NARA Date 8/20/07

REPRODUCED AT THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES

PROPAGANDA REPORT
20 DECEMBER 1957

- 20 -

A similar object lesson was publicized in RED STAR on 16 November. The army paper reported that at a Party meeting at a military depot the commander was criticized for failing to carry out his political indoctrination work and "for incorrectly understanding the Leninist principle of edinsonachalie, not listening to the voice of his subordinates, and being rude to them." The commander was also charged with having misused his official position. The commander's response, according to RED STAR, was to hurl "unfounded accusations" against his critics at the Party meeting and then to threaten transfers "if you don't hold your tongue." The same commander was alleged to have rid himself of an annoying critic on an earlier occasion by writing a low efficiency report which resulted in the transfer of the officer involved.

While the abolition of edinonachalie, in force now for 15 years and treated in military literature as an immutable principle, seems out of the question, some modification in the direction of weakening the professional commander's position vis-a-vis the Party's agent in the armed forces appears to be in progress. One such move has already been made with respect to the number of hours set aside from the training schedule for political indoctrination, an old sore point in Party-army relations. Within two weeks of Zhukov's removal from the Party Presidium and Central Committee, it was announced that the number of hours devoted to political indoctrination of officers will be more than doubled. SOVIET FLEET's 15 November editorial says explicitly that the joint decision of the new Defense Minister and the Main Political Administration was taken on the initiative of Party members in the armed forces:

According to an 18 December New York TIMES dispatch from Moscow, RED STAR has recently discussed other provisions of this or a supplemental directive which make attendance at 50 hours a year of lectures and seminars obligatory, rather than voluntary, for all Soviet officers, including generals.

Political information, an important form of educational work that has been reinstated in the interests of prompt and timely explanations of the decisions of the Communist Party and Soviet government to sailors and non-commissioned officers, as well as in the interests of the elucidation of the tasks of detachments, groups

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CONFIDENTIAL

PROPAGANDA REPORT
20 DECEMBER 1957

- 17 -

tell the truth, squarely, without fearing that it might offend someone, wound his self-esteem. I firmly believe: If a man has the Party spirit he need not fear criticism or the grim truth.

Another RED STAR article on 1 September, entitled "Party Discipline Is the Same for All Communists," emphasized that military rank is not the measure of a Communist's obligations to the Party. Written by a Major Katsai, that article also discussed the Instructions' requirement for active participation in Party work by all Communists in the armed forces. It condemned the lenient views taken by Party bureaus toward "certain senior Communist officers among us" who failed to carry out Party assignments:

Members of the bureau looked at it this way: Public speeches before the troops is the service duty of the chief, and we cannot criticize him for what he does not say.

The author censured Party secretaries who have not "mastered the spirit and the essence" of the new Instructions, citing the example of one secretary who failed to be sufficiently exacting toward a Party member who happened to outrank him:

One should sharply reproach Secretary of the Staff Organization Captain Ogurtsov, who is often called upon to assign tasks to Communists senior in rank to himself. If he assigns them at all, then he does not check up on how they are being carried out. But what do rank and office matter when it is a question of Party duties and discipline?

The intrusion of considerations of military rank into questions bearing on Party obligations and discipline was condemned again on 12 September in an article by Maj. Gen. A. Shmelev, Chief of the MPA of the Far Eastern Military District. Although General Shmelev warned against tolerance of demagogic speeches at Party meetings "aimed at disorganizing Party ranks, fomenting disloyalty toward the Party leadership and undermining edinonachalie," he also warned that the demands of Party discipline and Party ethics applied equally to all Communists, regardless of military rank:

Although infrequently, we still meet Communists who do not reckon with the demands of Party discipline and Party ethics. Communist Silant'ev, for example, was repeatedly late at meetings and did not attend theoretical seminars. On one occasion he did not stop at calling several Communists out of a Party meeting, without any special need for it. He regarded the slightest criticism as "undermining his authority" and did not miss an opportunity to obtain satisfaction for having been criticized. In order to collect his membership dues, Party organization Secretary Nesterenko has to go to his study--how conceited this Party member is! But not long ago Comrade Silant'ev learned a lesson: At a Party meeting the Communists subjected him to sharp and just criticism for his rude attitude toward Party discipline. They reminded the comrade that in the eyes of the Party all are equal and that no one is permitted to violate norms of Party life.

CONFIDENTIAL

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Authority NND45358

By SA NARA Date 8/20/09

REPRODUCED AT THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES

CONFIDENTIAL

PROPAGANDA REPORT
20 DECEMBER 1957

- 21 -

and ships. Such lectures on political information will be conducted twice a week for 30 minutes. Students at military schools will attend such political information lectures once a week for 50 minutes.

In addition, SOVIET FLEET said, daily training schedules have been revised to set aside "not less than two evenings a week, in addition to days off and evenings preceding days off" for the conduct of "political, mass, cultural and educational activities" with servicemen.

Local Party committees, whose officials are not inhibited by considerations of military rank, have been encouraged to play a more active part in the Party life of military units stationed within their areas of jurisdiction. Marshal Zhukov has been accused of disrupting the close ties between political bodies in the armed forces and local Party committees--a close relationship specifically required by the provisions of the CPSU Statutes governing Party organizations in the army and navy.

The revival of attention to the role of military councils (voennye sovery), both in the Central Committee resolution and in commentaries on the Zhukov purge, suggests that the influence of regional Party Secretaries will now be brought more directly to bear at the Military District level. During World War II, military councils headed by front commanders and high-level Party representatives were established for each front and granted full military and administrative powers within their jurisdictions. These councils were retained after the war as "consultative organs" for Military District commanders, but references to them in the military press have been rare in recent years.

On the local level, Party committees have been encouraged to intervene more actively in the life of military units. Party apparachiks seemed quick to take the hint that what they may have regarded as the privileged position of Communist officers was no longer tenable. SOVIET RUSSIA on 3 November quoted the following statement by the secretary of a factory Party committee in Gorkiy:

Several times I happened to be present at Party conferences of a military unit, and each time I was struck by the same situation: the chief of the political section would deliver a report and during the discussion privates and sergeants would be criticized. One cannot criticize officers, it was said; this allegedly undermines their authority. There is no doubt that the decision of the plenum of the CPSU Central Committee will enable the development of healthy criticism, will further strengthen our armed forces, and will elevate the role of Party organizations in the army and navy.

At an aktiv meeting of the Kiev city and oblast Party organizations, Kiev City Committee Secretary Sinitsa pledged that his organization, in implementing the decisions of the October Plenum, "will increase patronage work in the army, will systematically organize meetings of working people with military personnel, and will arrange lectures and talks in military units by the Party-Soviet aktiv, pace-setting industrial workers, writers, artists, and composers...." (Kiev Radio, 3 November). At the same meeting, a raion committee secretary condemned Zhukov for suppressing, "by his ignominious methods," the activities of political organs, and urged local Party organizations to "draw the necessary conclusions" from the decisions of the October Central Committee plenum. They should, he said, "increase their relations with Party and political organs of the Soviet army, share work experiences with them, more widely establish the patronage of enterprises, institutions and educational establishments over army groups and units."

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NND45358
By SA NARA Date 8/20/09

REPRODUCED AT THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES

APPENDIX

On 26 October, several hours before Zhukov's return to the USSR, RED STAR and SOVIET FLEET appeared in Moscow with editorials on Party-political work in the armed forces. These editorials not only foreshadowed the charges later leveled against Zhukov by the Party Central Committee, but contained substantial verbatim extracts and close paraphrases of passages from the Central Committee resolution which was not made public until the evening of 2 November.

CENTRAL COMMITTEE RESOLUTION
(2 November 1957)

In the postwar years, thanks to the concern of the Communist Party and the Soviet government, on the basis of the general upsurge of the national economy of our country, of big successes in the development of heavy industry, science and technology, the Armed Forces of the USSR reached a new higher level in their development. They are equipped with all types of modern military techniques and arms, including atomic and hydrogen weapons and rocket technology.

* * *

The complex international situation, the arms race in the main capitalist countries, the interests of the defense of our motherland demand from commanders, political organs and party organizations continuous perfection of military preparedness of the troops, the strengthening of military discipline among personnel, their education in the spirit

RED STAR
(26 October 1957)

In the postwar years, thanks to the concern of the Communist Party and the Soviet government, on the basis of the general upsurge of the national economy of our country, of big successes in the development of heavy industry, science and technology, the Armed Forces of the USSR reached a new higher level in their development. They are equipped with all types of modern military techniques and arms, including atomic and hydrogen weapons and rocket technology.

* * *

The complex international situation, the arms race in the main capitalist countries, the interests of the defense of our motherland demand from commanders, political organs and party organizations continuous perfection of military preparedness of the troops, the strengthening of military discipline among personnel, their education in the spirit

SOVIET FLEET
(26 October 1957)

In line with the interests of the security of the Motherland, the Party demands from commanders, political organs and Party organizations continuous perfection of the military preparedness of units, ships and formations, the firm strengthening of military discipline among personnel and concern for satisfying the spiritual and material needs of the servicemen.

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of loyalty to the Motherland, to the Communist Party, concern for satisfying the spiritual and material needs of the servicemen.

* * *

The plenary meeting of the Central Committee of the CPSU considers that in solving these tasks especially great significance is attached to the further improvement of Party-political work in the Soviet army and navy which must strengthen the military might of our armed forces, rally the personnel around the Communist Party and Soviet government, educate servicemen in the spirit of selfless loyalty to the Soviet motherland, in the spirit of friendship of the peoples of the USSR and of proletarian internationalism.

* * *

The Congress of the CPSU posed for the Party and the people the task of maintaining our defense at the level of modern military techniques and science, insuring the security of our socialist state. In solving this task along with commanders exercising single authority, an important role in the solution of this task belongs to the military councils,

of loyalty to the Motherland, to the Communist Party.

* * *

Of especially great significance in resolving this task is Party-political work in the Soviet army and navy. This work must strengthen the military might of the armed forces, rally the personnel around the Communist Party and the Soviet government, educate servicemen in the spirit of selfless loyalty to the Soviet motherland, of friendship among the peoples of the USSR, and of proletarian internationalism. The further improvement of Party-political work is a task of the greatest importance.

* * *

The further improvement of Party-political work in the armed forces is of especially great significance in this connection. The political organs and Party organizations must in all their activities strengthen the military might of the Soviet army and navy, rally the personnel around the Communist Party and the Soviet government, educate servicemen in the spirit of selfless loyalty to the Soviet motherland, in the spirit of the friendship of the peoples of the USSR, and of proletarian internationalism.

* * *

In solving the tasks posed for the Soviet armed forces, along with commanders exercising single authority, an important role belongs to the military councils, the political organs and the Party organizations.

CENTRAL COMMITTEE RESOLUTION

The main source of the might of our army and navy lies in the fact that their organizer, leader and teacher is the Communist Party--the leading and directing force of Soviet society. We must always remember V. I. Lenin's directive that "the policy of the military establishment, like that of all other establishments and institutions, is pursued in strict accordance with the general directives given by the Party through its Central Committee and under its immediate control."

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RED STAR

The main source of the might of the Soviet army and navy lies in the fact that their organizer, leader and teacher is the Communist Party--the leading and directing force of Soviet society. We must always remember V. I. Lenin's directive that "the policy of the military establishment, like that of all other establishments and institutions, is pursued in strict accordance with the general directives given by the Party through its Central Committee and under its immediate control."

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SOVIET FLEET

The main source of the might of our army and navy lies in the fact that their organizer, leader and teacher is the Communist Party--the leading and directing force of Soviet society. In organizing and training the armed forces the Party always applied V. I. Lenin's directive that "the policy of the military establishment, like that of all other establishments and institutions, is pursued in strict accordance with the general directives given by the Party through its Central Committee and under its immediate control."

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Since the Central Committee plenum on the Zhukov affair is widely reported to have been held several days after Zhukov's return, it is probable that the RED STAR and SOVIET FLEET editorials of 26 October were based on a Presidium resolution on Zhukov later submitted to the Central Committee.* Such a resolution

* Moscow has not specified when the Central Committee plenum was held. The official announcement states only that a plenum was held "at the end of October" and the decision of the plenum is undated. This represents a striking departure from post-Stalin Party practice. The Zhukov decision is the first CPSU Central Committee decision released to the public since Stalin's death that has not borne the date of its adoption. Some official announcements of plenums have given both the starting and concluding dates of the meetings, but in all cases except one, the concluding date could be determined by the dating of the resolution adopted. The announcement on the July 1953 plenum which purged Beria gave no dates, although the dates 2-7 July were provided when the announcement was reprinted in the 1954 edition of The CPSU in Resolutions and Decisions of Congresses, Conferences and Central Committee Plenums.

was mentioned in a regional radio report of a meeting of the Magadan city and oblast Party aktiv held on 3 November. One of the participants at that meeting told of an earlier meeting of the Party aktiv of the Far Eastern Military District which was held "in connection with the resolution of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union on the question of Party-political work in the Soviet army and navy."

The RED STAR and SOVIET FLEET editorials appear to confirm that the decision to remove Zhukov from high Party office as well as from his Defense Ministry post had been effectively taken prior to his return to Moscow. That these military papers were authorized to publish in advance extracts of this resolution is a measure of the Presidium's confidence that it would be approved by the Central Committee.*

* Two regional broadcast reports of Party aktiv meetings attribute to the Central Committee both the decision to release Zhukov as Defense Minister and the decision to remove him from the Presidium and Central Committee. A 5 November Yerevan broadcast, reviewing SOVETAKAN HAYASTAN's account of a Yerevan aktiv meeting reported that: "The meeting of the aktiv unanimously approved the decision of the CPSU Central Committee plenary session to relieve Marshal Zhukov of his duties as Soviet Defense Minister and to expel him from membership in the Presidium of the CPSU Central Committee and from membership in the CPSU Central Committee." According to 4 November Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk broadcast, the newspaper SOVETSKIY SAKHALIN reported that an oblast Party aktiv meeting "unanimously approved the decision of the Central Committee of the CPSU on the expulsion of Comrade Zhukov from membership in the Presidium of the Central Committee of the CPSU and from membership in the Central Committee of the CPSU and his release from the post of Minister of Defense of the USSR."

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